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THE FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS IN HERDER'S THOUGHT. I

THE PRINCIPLE OF PERSONALITY

In the work of a writer who has produced a deep and far-reaching effect on the ideas and tendencies of his own and succeeding generations, and who is universally recognized as one of the few principal authors of an epoch in the history of civilization, there must have been acting, within the many contradictions imbedded in particular conclusions, within the endless modifications and concrete adaptations caused by the fortunes of a busy life and the pull and push of his environment by which is brought forward a constant stream of interests and inhibitions, and within the temporary and superficial bewilderments and perplexities as to methods of procedure, by which every pathfinder is beset—there must have been acting in all this diversity of mental effort a significant individual force, which, no matter how complex, can be expressed in a term of unity. As in the work of Herder's philosophical contemporary and early teacher, Kant, this term is found as the systematic criticism of the analytic reason, conceived as an absolute standard of knowledge; and in that of his poetical contemporary and early disciple, Goethe, in the spontaneous and harmonious response of all the faculties, emotional, imaginative, and intellectual, to the important concrete realities of life; so there must be attainable an integral conception of Herder, which may be regarded as the proper focus in which all the elements of his immensely rich product of ideas are joined.

It is with the mental character of Herder that we are concerned. That there is need for further study of this subject, there is no doubt. The monumental work of Haym, which will continue for many years to be the classic biography of Herder, limits itself in its theoretical parts to relating Herder to the chief currents of systematic philosophy, particularly the rationalism of Leibnitz and Kant. This method of orientation fixes the focus of the account outside of Herder's thought, so that the latter's ideas appear as secondary forms of systems which have their unities in other minds, of which Herder inevitably appears as a more or less imperfect variant. No matter how sympathetic and large-minded such an account—and that of Haym is admirably so—it cannot present Herder's thought as an integral whole. It gives many of its principal aspects, but not as the expressions of the unified mental character, Herder, but rather as so many individual particulars plucked from, now this, now that, feature of the theoretical minds of various systematic philosophers.

It was perhaps in recognition of some of the shortcomings of this method, to which, however, he paid a disappointing allegiance in his introduction to Herder's *Ideen*¹ that Professor Kühnemann attempted to account for Herder's thought by his personality. He apparently did not realize that personality conceived as prior to mind—for it cannot be conceived as productive of mind unless it be prior to it—is devoid of meaning. Personality implies an indissoluble reciprocal union of the two common abstractions, the concrete person and his mind.

Moreover, such an account, if it could be successful, would not solve the problem at issue, which is the theoretical unity of Herder's thought. All the concrete facts of the growth of Herder's personality become relevant to this problem only through being brought into its focus. The failure of Professor Kühnemann's essay lies in his neither having brought out new essential facts nor having found the proper focus in which the old facts would acquire more significant meanings.

Other writers, who will be referred to in their proper places, limit themselves to relating particular theories of Herder to the

¹ In Kürschner's *National-Litteratur*, Vol. LXXVII, 1, 1; see also Eugen Kühnemann, *Herder's Persönlichkeit in seiner Weltanschauung*, Berlin, 1893.

history of kindred theories, without attempting to investigate the foundations of Herder's thought as a whole.

Herder's dominant intellectual interests and his most potent critical energies moved in the fields of literature, particularly poetry, and of art, and in these his principal ideas developed first and with greatest force and clarity. They entered later, and with less certainty and authority, though with great energy and comprehension, the fields of general history, which he regarded as the history of civilization or the human mind, education, systematic philosophy, ethics, even politics. He did not apply his original ideas even to religion, which was his profession, and which for a long time he even theoretically accepted naïvely in the form of Lutheran liberal orthodoxy, until he had done his most important work on literature, the arts, and history.

It is in these later fields that his thought occasionally suffers from a certain vagueness and from contradictions in theoretical construction. Most of his critics, especially those trained in systematic philosophy, being more interested in the apparent weightiness of his later subjects, are inclined to regard these lapses as fundamental flaws in his thought.

Herder has thus come to be judged an inspirer, a stimulator, a sort of John in the Wilderness, offering many and fertile suggestions, and giving, by the fineness of his temper and the richness of his knowledge and language, a strong and abundant impulse to other minds, endowed with the more essential gifts of trained critical or inspired artistical genius, but not as himself the possessor of truly fundamental powers or the bearer of a definitive message.

Herder's views were arranged, in accordance with his intuitive and concrete genius, not like those of his later great antagonist, Kant, in systematic order from clearly defined abstract premises to theoretic unity, but pragmatically, in concrete progression from one problem to another which involved embodiments of his principal ideas. The lack of systematic disposition pertaining to this method has been generally, though with only partial justice, mistaken for lack of any essential order, and has produced, even in serious students of Herder, an impression of fragmentariness and incoherence, which has obscured the high degree of completeness and consistency of his ideas.

Externally, his ideas are often clothed in the bristling array of direct and indirect conflict, sometimes with various intellectual faults of his age, but most often and prominently with the then ruling rationalistic tendencies in literary and aesthetic theory and in systematic philosophy, and carry some of the passing débris of conflict with them. It is necessary to cast aside this now useless and confusing encumbrance before the underived substance of his thought comes to the surface.

Since Lessing, at the time of his *Laokoon*, was the most eminent representative of aesthetic rationalism (from which he turned almost immediately afterward, in his *Dramaturgie*, and still more in the practice of *Emilia Galotti*, approaching the position of Herder), and since Kant remained the leader of philosophical rationalism, it was natural, even if not in keeping with his true importance, that Herder, whose ideas were antagonistic particularly to rationalism, should single them out for his criticisms, and be carried even to the length of partly presenting his own ideas not in their real positive bearings on his position, but in the negative and not essential relations of exceptions to his adversaries' conclusions and critical methods, with the result that he suffered the penalty, which the polemical author never wholly escapes, of having his positive products annexed as mere amendments to the body of the achievements of others. Even to the present day the general opinion regarding these critical essays has not been able to free itself from this illusion of the polemical aspect—an illusion which is one of the many shapes of that intellectual Proteus, overgeneralization.¹

The first work in which, though limited to a particular aesthetical problem, there appeared in precise form the ideas whereon his theories were to rest in his *Erstes Kritisches Wäldchen*, published in the beginning of 1769, in which he proceeded from a radical criticism of the conclusions published three years before by Lessing in his *Laokoon* to a statement of his own position.

An investigation of Herder's theory should therefore start with this essay. Since, however, the subject of this study is not Herder's

¹ See for instance, in addition to those already mentioned, Professor W. G. Howard's scholarly introduction to his edition of *Laokoon, Lessing, Herder, Goethe*, (New York, Holt, 1910), pp. cl, clviii, in which the first *Wäldchen* is regarded chiefly as a criticism of Lessing's essay; Dr. Friedland, *Über das Verhältniss von Herder's "Erstem Kritischem Wäldchen" zu Lessing's "Laokoon"* (Progr. Bromberg, 1905).

aesthetical theory, but the fundamental complex of ideas underlying his aesthetical as well as all his other important theories, aesthetical detail will even in the chapter devoted to that *Wäldchen* be considered only as far as it lies in the focus of that complex.

SURVEY OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN
AESTHETICAL THEORIES BEFORE LESSING

The chief importance of Lessing's *Laokoon* lies in its character as the most eminent attempt of the eighteenth century to combine the aesthetical element of the two principal philosophical currents of the era beginning with the Renaissance, the absolutistic-rationalistic, and the empirical-psychological, with its variant, the naturalistic-sensualistic. It foreshadows the attempt, represented by the Kantian philosophy, to extend this harmonization to the entire field of knowledge.

The rationalistic elements of Lessing's theory center in the traditional conception of "imitation" of truth and nature; the naturalistic-sensualistic, in a changed view of nature and new ideas regarding the dependence of all knowledge, and consequently, of the matters and techniques pertaining to poetry and the arts, upon the functions of the senses.

RATIONALISM IN AESTHETICAL THEORY

The doctrine of "imitation," "mimesis," was first formulated by Aristotle, who in his *Poetics* taught that art "imitated" not indeed the literal details of nature, but more or less generalized conceptions based on natural realities. This idea entered modern theory through Vida's and Scaliger's Latin works in which the rules given by Aristotle combined with those formulated by Horace were established as the absolute and ultimate canons of art and poetry.

This doctrine received its classical French form by Boileau, and thence was taken over into German literature, where it held sway almost until Lessing. The revolt of the Swiss, Bodmer and Breitinger, against the French influence as represented by Gottshed, was not directed against the principle of imitation as such, which was assumed to rest secure upon the authority of Aristotle, but against

the French rationalistic interpretation of the nature which was to be imitated.

Boileau identified nature with truth of ideas, reason. According to him, truth is both nature and the beautiful. "Nothing is beautiful except the true." "Nature is true," *et d'abord on la sent*, i.e., "and nature brings with it its own evidence." The imitation of this trinity of truth-of-nature-which-is-beauty must, however, not be literal, yet it must be clothed in sufficient verisimilitude to produce the "illusion" of reality. But it must not give pain. The imitation even of things in themselves offensive should give pleasure. The rules for accomplishing this result are embodied in, and to be derived from, classical art.

If we ask for a discussion of the meaning of the term beauty, Boileau answers, that beauty and taste have rules "absolute, universal, and necessary." This can only mean that they are superior to any conditions of environment or individuality and cannot be accounted for on any grounds of concrete empirical experience. The rationalistic conception excludes from its conception of beauty-nature-truth the character of individuality.

If we probe this conception farther, we find that it represents no ascertainable specific substance, but is a formal abstraction drawn from those works of classical art which have come down to us, and supported by classical and post-classical aesthetic theory. It is a conception without any authentic or original foundation. It rests not on the mental processes of creative art but of formal analysis at second hand.

Batteux' later doctrine that art should imitate only beautiful nature is largely a qualification of Boileau's formula.

Boileau's theory embraced the Horatian doctrine, "*ut pictura poesis*." For if general ideas are the proper subjects common to all the arts, there is no reason why the same laws of technique should not prevail in all.

NATURALISM IN AESTHETICAL THEORY

The naturalistic conception of reality produced two principal branches. The one, which concerned itself with the objective substance of nature, had its beginning with Bacon; the other, which

specialized in the particular sense-processes by which the objective reality "out there," in accordance with the dualism of that age, a remnant of the medieval view of life, was supposed to be conveyed to the mind "in here," started with Locke. This branch is called in some of its representatives associationistic, in others sensualistic, philosophy.

Bacon's own purpose was a general natural science which rejected all a priori methods of generalization and proceeded exclusively by inductive analysis of nature. But he, too, could not free himself from the dualistic tradition of medieval theology. He believed, and Hobbes agreed with him, that only scientific truth was amenable to reason, but that poetry was ruled by the imagination. While thus ignoring the Cartesian dualism of conscious mind and dead matter, which was characteristic of French rationalism and which underlay the aesthetic theories of Boileau and French classicism, he in turn established a different dualism in the opposition of a superior scientific reality, drawn from nature by inductive reasoning, to an inferior poetical reality pertaining to obscure processes of the imagination, which were regarded as spontaneous, intuitive, unanalyzable, irresponsible, and irrelevant to the serious business of life, and in their entirety, as essentially disparate from those of "reason."

Bacon and Hobbes, however, laid, without suspecting it, in this dualism the foundation of a movement which was for a time to assume far greater dimensions than the scientific movement they desired to bring about, and which in philosophy throughout the eighteenth century and beyond, all but overwhelmed it. This was subjective naturalism. The imagination, once having been acknowledged as the subjective organ for the apprehension and expression of nature, as the bridge between the inner emotions and the outer being, came necessarily to be regarded as the exclusive aesthetic faculty. As the formalism of rationalism, its absoluteness and emotional poverty, its lack of empirical flexibility, individuality, and spontaneity, grew less satisfactory through repetition, the absorption in a subjective, spontaneous, emotional interpretation of nature became more and more ardent. This reaction is known in the history of literature, especially in England, Switzerland, France, and

Germany, as the awakening of the nature-sense, the emotional revolt against rationalism, or the Romantic movement in its more general sense. It appeared, in one of its least extreme forms, in Shaftesbury's teaching that the highest test of worth is enthusiasm embodied in the aristocrat and man of the world, whose emotions have been trained to the highest degree of refinement. The revolt gave rise to the doctrine of the original genius as the sole standard of art and poetry, in Edward Young's *Conjectures on Original Composition* and in Diderot's essays; to the theories on imagination and native individuality based on English theory and further developed by Bodmer and Breitinger; to the emphasis put on the passions in contrast to ideas by Dubos and Diderot; to the ever-growing insistence on individuality and spontaneous impulse as the fundamental forces of life, which reached its climax in Rousseau. Further, it became generalized in the transcendentalism of Hamann, Wordsworth, and the Romantic poets and philosophers of Germany, the Schlegels, Wackenroder, Fichte, Schelling, Novalis, Grillparzer, and many others, the central idea of which is the absolute unity of nature and the soul of man in God, and in the conception of all truth as a unified ecstatic vision of spontaneous beatitudes unspoiled by worldly contacts. The identity of soul and nature, nature animism, *Naturbe-seelung*, is the test of subjective naturalism in all its later forms.¹

Compared with the abstract rationalism of the classical school, this subjective naturalism, with all its chaotic variations, uncertainties, and arbitrariness represented individuality and spontaneity as opposed to fixed and monotonous conventionality. Boileau's conception of beauty excludes creative originality both as to content and form. The poet's and artist's genius is limited to the adaptation of absolute traditional rules and forms of expression to ideas which have no final roots in his individual experience but in an impersonal, universal, i.e., extra-individual, absolute realm of truth. This lack of authenticity, this cold and unimaginative formalism is the fatal defect of all systems of aesthetic classicism since Aristotle.

¹ For the details of this development see von Hein, *Die Entstehung der neueren Aesthetik* (Stuttgart, Cotta, 1886), Zweiter Abschnitt, pp. 81-271; Malcolm H. Dewey, *Herder's Relation to the Aesthetic Theory of the 18th Century* (University of Chicago Dissertation, George Banta Publishing Co., Menasha, Wis., 1920); W. G. Howard, Introduction to Witkowski, *Georg. Lessing's Werke*. Leipzig Bibliographisches Institut, Vol. 4, Einleitung.

The aesthetic angers inherent in subjective naturalism, on the other hand, are those of the temptations of all subjectivity, which in its extreme forms leads to a self-centered disregard of objective reality, to impulsiveness and temperamental wilfulness and ethical irresponsibility—in short, to all the faults of Romanticism.

From the subjective naturalism of the eighteenth century we must distinguish the opposite tendency of purely objective naturalism, called materialism, which developed simultaneously with the former, and whose most extreme representatives were de Lamettrie, Dietrich von Holboch (*Système de la nature*),¹ and Helvetius. The materialists interpret nature as a purely physical mechanism, denying the reality of the soul, except as a symbol of physical forces. They are the direct opposite of the Romanticists. The form of nature, which materialistic art and poetry are supposed to imitate, is a literal aggregate of physical objects and their properties. The artistic naturalism which grew out of this movement rapidly succumbed to the triumph of the subjective-idealistic movement, which was to dominate European civilization for more than three generations. But it reappeared by the new scientific vehicle of evolutionary biology, in the last generation of the nineteenth century, as a great force in art and literature.

THE SENSUALISTIC BRANCH OF NATURALISM

The sensualistic, or psychological, branch of naturalistic philosophy had as its chief representatives Condillac and Diderot. Lessing was most directly influenced by Diderot, whose "lettre sur les sourds et les muets" offered a method for the sensualistic attack on the classical doctrine, "ut pictura poesis."

The sensualistic theory in aesthetics simply meant that since according to Locke the ideas contained in the mind are not innate but as it were in accordance with the dualism of the inner and outer realities peculiar to his age, carried there from the outer world by the senses, art and poetry must be differentiated in accordance with the particular sense which governs the means of expression pertaining to each. Consequently, poetry, which is communicated through

¹ Cf. Lange, "Geschichte des Materialismus," *Windelband, Gesch. d. Phil.* (1892), 5. Teil, p. 349.

the ear, must follow some particular order of association determined by the sense of hearing, and pictorial art, analogously, some particular order of association related to seeing.¹

THE DEVELOPMENT OF HERDER'S CENTRAL IDEA

Lessing begins his argument in *Laokoon* with the assumption that the classical Greeks, while they permitted crying as an expression of pain in poetry, rejected it in sculpture, and that their motives for acting thus in apparent contradiction were considerations of beauty. Philoktetes, in Sophocles' drama, *Mars*, in the *Iliad*, when he is wounded by Diomed; Venus, in the *Iliad*, though but slightly scratched; Laokoon, in the *Aeneid*, when attacked by serpents, all cry out. The Trojans, on the other hand, are forbidden by their King Priam to cry. Lessing explains this difference by saying that Homer intended to make us realize the difference in civilization between Greeks and Trojans. The former could cry and yet retain their self-control, while the less-civilized Trojans, by giving way to their feelings, might be demoralized. Lessing adds that the modern man also refrains from giving free tongue to his feelings; but not, like the Trojans, from fear of losing his self-possession but from a deeply fixed habit of self-repression.

In Lessing's view, the fundamental difference between art and poetry is revealed by a comparison of the late-Greek sculptural group of the death of Laokoon, the Trojan high priest, who had warned his people against the wooden horse left by the Greeks, and of his two sons, in the coils of two serpents sent by Poseidon, with the passage in the *Aeneid* by which it had been inspired. In Virgil's account, Laokoon "lifts a fearful roar to the heavens," whereas in the group he is represented as a man who in an agonized struggle suppresses any outcry or at most emits a groan.

¹ Since the subject of this essay is not Herder's aesthetic theories but the fundamental ideas underlying his view of reality, to which his criticism of Lessing's *Laokoon* simply opens the most direct road of approach, a discussion of the numerous theoretic details pertaining to the doctrine of aesthetic naturalism and sensualism up to Lessing and Herder, would only tend to disturb the focus of this inquiry.

The principal writers on aesthetic theory are the following: in England, Shaftesbury, Jonathan Richardson, Joseph Spence, Daniel Webb, James Harris, Hutcheson, Hume, Edward Young; in France, Dubos, Batteaux, Caylus, Condillac, Diderot, Rousseau; in Germany and German Switzerland, Bodmer and Breitinger, Baumgarten, Winkelman, Sulzer, and many others. See bibliographical references above, p. 72, footnote; and Windelband, *Gesch. d. Phil.* (Freiburg, 1892), 5. Teil, pp. 345 ff.

If, asks Lessing, men, and even gods cry out in Greek poetry without loss of dignity, why does the sculptor, who in making the statue of Laokoon followed the account of Virgil very closely, depart from the latter in the one particular of the crying? The reason cannot be in the unbecoming nature of crying as such, but must be in the difference of the means of expression pertaining to the two arts of poetry and picture-making. His final answer is that the Greeks depicted, or, to use his own term derived from Aristotle and French classical theory, "imitated" only *schöne Körper*. The Greek artist portrayed nothing except the "beautiful." Crying should not be depicted in sculpture because it gives the mouth the appearance of a cavity and distorts the face.

By this principle of formal beauty the Greek sculptor was obliged to refrain from the representation of certain passions which produce distortions of face and body, like rage and despair. Wrath has to be toned down to seriousness, misery to sorrow. When grief is too strong to be thus reduced to lineaments of beauty, as in the scene of Agamemnon at the sacrifice of his daughter, Iphigenia, the Greek artist veils the father's face.

Herder takes exception to every one of Lessing's generalizations. Lessing is mistaken in assuming that Homer's heroes generally cry. Agamemnon, when wounded, convulsively controls himself without crying, Hector, the Trojan, when struck by a heavy rock, falls in silence; Menelaus, wounded by an arrow, draws out the weapon without a sound; Diomed, badly wounded, asks Sthenelus to draw the arrow from the wound, uttering imprecations against his enemies. Philoktetes, in Sophocles' play, does not cry lustily, but represses his pain, giving vent to it only occasionally. Moreover, his pain is not mainly physical but mental; it is the hopeless desolation of a life of complete solitude, helpless squalor, want of care, affection, and fellowship, of all that makes life human. The fifth chapter, which consists of the analysis of Sophocles' *Philoktetes* is one of the fine pieces of literary analysis which abound in Herder's writings.

Pherekles, in the *Iliad*, when he is caught in flight, clamors loudly, not because Greek heroes cried customarily, but because Homer intended to depict him as a coward. Mars, when wounded by the javelin of Diomed, roars like ten thousand warriors so that

both armies are horrified, not because crying is a general law of Greek nature, but by virtue of his particular character as the gross, ferocious god of war raging in battle; and, analogously, Venus, though barely scratched, sets up a loud and piteous lament, not because all Greeks did likewise but because she is the tender, self-indulgent, petted goddess of love.

In thus showing that in Homer and other classical Greek poets the expression of pain is used as a means of characterization and not as a general formal convention, and that each different expression must be considered in its specific elements and relations to the character uttering it and to the circumstances in which that character moves, Herder replaces Lessing's rationalistic generalization by the true principle of individualization, which should dominate both poetic and artistic analysis.

He applies this principle also to Priam and the Trojans. Priam forbids his people to weep, not because they are barbarians and must be kept in an insensate condition, but because he is heroic and tries to make them realize that they must indulge in no grief while their native land is invaded.

From this analysis there follows an important conclusion which Herder draws in a discussion of elegiac poetry (chaps. iii and iv). In reviewing the poetry of suffering produced by different peoples, Herder finds that it reveals characteristic differences. For instance, Ragnor Lodbrog's song of former victories uttered in unbearable physical torture is characteristic of the ruggedness of the Norse character. Priam's lament over Hector's body, on the other hand, is expressive of the more gentle and civilized nature of the Trojan people. National elegies embody the national spirit of a people. Herder thus expands his principle of individual personality to that of a collective, racial, and national personality.

However, Herder continues, while each people has its own individuality, each is essential to the whole of humanity. It is wrong to suppose, as Lessing does, that the Greeks alone were truly human. From this it follows that the Greeks cannot be the sole possessors of the truth of the beautiful.

Moreover, it is wrong, as Lessing asserts, that the Greeks never represented anything but beauty. Lessing had said that the Greeks

had never pictured a fury. But, retorts Herder, the Greeks did depict ugliness. Medusa, with snakes instead of hair, Venus in Moschus' poem, grieving over the death of Adonis, are abhorrent. He draws several conclusions, which, while they appear as mere modifications of Lessing's theory, are in fact new principles. The permanent characters of the personages of high Greek art, Herder concedes, were never ugly or terrible, but their passing states of mind may be both. Secondary characters, however, may be ugly by way of contrast with the principal ones, as the giants under the chariot of angry Jove, or Satyrs, Silenus, and Bacchantes surrounding Bacchus, or the head of Medusa in the shield of Pallas Athene. So much for the gods. The same is true of the heroes. Thersites in the *Iliad* is not merely ridiculous, as Lessing thought, but an ugly, odious blackguard. Now Herder takes up the picture of Agamemnon veiling his face at the sacrifice of Iphigenia. Again Herder individualizes by showing that Agamemnon does not represent a universal principle of art, as Lessing thought, but that he acts as the great king he was. Ajax, or Medea, would have acted differently each in accordance with his or her individuality.

The additional principle, however, which determines Herder's discussion of the ugly and underlies that of Agamemnon's veiling his face, though it is not yet clearly realized by him, is that of the focus of composition, another form of individualization. This principle demands the subordination of all secondary factors in a composition in such a manner that the central idea, character, or action receives from those factors additional emphasis and significance. Thus the Satyrs, Silenus, and Bacchantes are not depicted for their own sakes, either as ideas or as forms of composition, but for the purpose of adding meanings and pictorial enrichments which a single figure of Bacchus could not possibly express. In the Iphigenia group, she, not Agamemnon, is the focal character, and the figure of Agamemnon had to be subordinated in the interest of the unity of the composition.

His principle of individualization gives Herder his standard for judging the remaining generalizations of Lessing. The roaring of Laokoon in Virgil's account according to this principle is not as Lessing assumes good poetry but as faulty there as it would be in

pictorial art. For it is not compatible with the dignity of his character. It is false individualization. The sculptor of the group, in giving Laokoon the expression and posture of silent agony, deviated from Virgil not because the technique of his particular art constrained him but because in this particular he was the better artist, gifted with a finer feeling for individuality. The best Greek artists, as is shown in the example of Philoktetes and many Homeric characters, do not make their lofty characters roar. Virgil, in the Laokoon scene, loses himself in externalities of description.

From the principle of individualization as opposed to Lessing's principle of general imitation of external objects, Herder proceeds to the formulation of the purpose of art which is higher than that of formal and abstract beauty. The new purpose which owes its emergence to the modern interest in nature, is *Wahrheit und Ausdruck*, expressive truth or characteristic or individual truth. He did not, however, now any more than later, go the length of the naturalistic demands of the Storm and Stress movement for an exclusively characteristic art. Artists, he says, are at all times limited in the full freedom of expressing the truth as they see it by tradition and convention. Among the ancients, for instance, the official religion was one of these limiting forces. It demanded that Bacchus have horns and so the sculptors of figures of Bacchus gave to the brows of their beautiful Bacchic youths indications of horns just sufficiently definite to satisfy traditional religion.

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[To be continued]